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Abstract—Understanding logical network connectivity is 
essential in network topology mapping especially in a 
fast growing network where knowing what is happening 
on the network is critical for security purposes and where 
knowing how network resources are being used is highly 
important. Mapping logical communication topology is 
important for network auditing, network maintenance and 
governance, network optimization, and network security. 
However, the process of capturing network traffic to 
generate the logical network topology may have a great 
influence on the operation of the network. In 
hierarchically structured networks such as control systems, 
typical active network mapping techniques are not 
employable as they can affect time-sensitive cyber-
physical processes, hence, passive network mapping is 
required. Though passive network mapping does not 
modify or disrupt existing traffic, current passive 
mapping techniques ignore many practical issues when 
used to generate logical communication topologies. In 
this paper, we present a methodology which compares 
topologies from an idealized mapping process with what 
is actually achievable using passive network mapping and 
identify some of the factors that can cause inaccuracies in 
logical maps derived from passively monitored network 
traffic. We illustrate these factors using a case study 
involving a hierarchical control network. 
 
Index Terms—Network logical topology, network 
modeling and mapping, network observability, network 
monitoring, network traffic analysis, network graph. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In practice, an existing physical network topology is 
not always the same as the original documented 
version of the physical network topology developed for 
the network. There is a need for an up-to-date knowledge 
of the network topology. Network topology mapping is 
becoming increasingly important especially in fast 
growing networks where the understanding of what is 
happening in the network is essential. Network traffic 
analysis is a fundamental tool used in constructing 
network topologies. Information such as the source 
address, destination address and communication 
protocols obtainable from observed network data packets, 
is a prerequisite for network topology mapping [21]. 
Network topology mapping is an essential technique used 
by network administrators and system analyst for 
network maintenance and governance, network 
optimization, network security and auditing. 
In traditional IT communication networks, active map- 
ping techniques are used but in time-sensitive control net- 
work, active mapping may affect negatively the network‘s 
operation, hence, passive network mapping is required. 
Passive monitoring involves observing network traffic 
that is already on the network without traffic modification 
or disruption of the network‘s performance.  In 
comparison, active monitoring techniques such as IP ping, 
traceroute and Network mapper (Nmap) can cause critical 
infrastructure equipment to stop working or cause delays 
to a time critical network due to the addition of overhead 
on the monitored communication paths.  Passive 
monitoring uses tools such as mirror or span ports and 
network taps designed to unintrusively capture network 
traffic. 
Evaluation of network traffic entails analyzing source 
and destination communication, that is, the data flow 
between network devices to identify the ―logical 
topology‖ of the network.  The logical topology 
represents how the devices communicate with one 
another. Hosmer [14] developed an open source program 
known as Python Passive Network Mapping (P2NMAP) 
to passively monitor a network to identify network 
devices and to identify unusual behaviors in the network. 
Hosmer [14] stated that depending upon how long the 
network was monitored, every node with an IP address on 
the network can be identified and how they are 
connected with each other on the network. Other 
information that can be deduced using   Hosmer‘s 
approach includes details of where and what devices have 
communicated, and at what time the communication was 
made. Though, topology mapping using passive 
monitoring was practically addressed by Hosmer‘s work, 
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the limitations of passive monitoring in topology 
discovery was not discussed. 
The contribution of our paper is to identify the 
challenging issues in the use of passive monitoring for 
topology mapping.   To do this, we present our 
experimental methodology which involves deriving an 
expected logical topology from the documented physical 
network topology, generating the observed logical 
topology from passively captured network traffic and 
then comparing the two logical topologies to identify the 
differences between what is observable in theory and in 
practice. 
Our results indicated that the expected topologies and 
the observed topologies did not completely align. We 
analyzed the results to determine why and found several 
reasons including inactive devices, broadcast messages 
with no destination address and newly introduced devices. 
We concentrated on available information from passively 
captured traffic, which includes layer 2 information (MAC 
Addresses) and layer 3 information (IP addresses) in the 
network packet header. Our contribution gives an insight 
into the extent to which topology observability is 
possible using passive network monitoring. 
In order to demonstrate the methodology of passively 
mapping a critical infrastructure network, a Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network was used 
as a case study.  A SCADA network is considered as a 
representative example of a critical infrastructure network 
due to the network‘s hierarchical structure, its wide 
variety of components, its use of subnets and its distinct 
traffic pattern and its use in remotely controlling 
industrial processes.  The rest of the paper is as follows: 
Section 2 is the related work.  Discussed in Section 3 are 
principles involved in passive network traffic monitoring 
and topology generation. Section 4 is our experimental 
methodology, while in Section 5 is a case study. Section 
6 presents our comparative analysis results. Section 7 
concludes our work and highlights our future research 
directions. 
 
II.  RELATED WORK 
Numerous vendors have developed commercial 
proprietary management tools and protocols useful for 
automatic topology discovery. These tools are mostly 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) based. 
Examples of such tools include HP‘s OpenView, IBM‘s 
Trivoli, AdvertNet OpManager, Actualit‘s Optimal 
Surveyor, Dartmouth Intermapper [5, 20] and the Cisco 
Prime Network is useful in network topology 
discovery [9].    Also in the research community, efforts 
have been made in the area of network topology 
discovery in Internet structure and Ethernet networks 
mainly using SNMP [4, 18, 20], ping/broadcast ping, 
zone transfer from DNS server and skitter [1, 11, 15]. 
Algorithms based on SNMP [5, 16, 17, 19], have been 
developed to obtain topology information such as IP ad- 
dresses from targeted devices‘ SNMP Management 
Information Bases (MIBs) which store object identifier 
(OID) numbers and network parameters in a tree 
formatted hierarchy.  Breitbart et al. [5] presented an 
algorithmic solution, which was developed to solve the 
problem of physical topology discovery in heterogeneous 
IP networks. Their algorithmic solution was based on 
SNMP, which uses information obtained from address 
forwarding tables containing Medium Access Control 
(MAC) addresses that are reachable from each device 
interface. Though the SNMP based algorithm generated 
remarkable results, the process of fetching packet 
information from the network is inefficient especially in 
modern standard IT networks and critical infrastructure 
networks. The algorithms depend on active probing 
mechanisms such as the ICMP ping mechanism and 
traceroute to adequately populate the SNMP MIBs and 
obtain complete network information [5].  The process of 
obtaining the topology information introduces additional 
overhead to the monitored path.  Other weak- nesses in 
the use of SNMP base algorithms include access 
restrictions to some device SNMP MIBs and some devices 
do not support SNMP [10]. The use of active techniques, 
especially in control systems, can cause network devices 
to shutdown, lockup or failed, hence, the need for passive 
monitoring. 
Passive monitoring has been used in analyzing traffic 
flow and topology discovery by several researchers [6, 7, 
12, 2]. In a paper by Castillo et al. [7], the observability 
problem in traffic network models was explored.  In ad- 
dressing the observability problems, two algebraic 
methods were proposed. The first proposal was the one 
global approach, which is based on null-spaces. The 
second proposal was one step-by-step procedure that 
allows the update of information of each item of Origin-
Destination (OD) pair or link flow once it is available. 
The proposed methods by Castillo et al. are useful in 
inferring information of OD-pair or link flows. 
Similarly, Hosmer [14] developed a tool to passively 
monitor network traffic and extract topology information 
from the captured packets.  P2NMAP passively captures 
packets flowing to and from TCP Port 443 and extracts 
key data such as serverIP, ClientIP and serverPort fields 
from packets traversing the network being monitored. 
Although, Hosmer [14] described a network mapping 
algorithm using Python to generate a list of source-
destination pairs from passively observed traffic, Hosmer 
failed to address the extent to which the generated list 
can be used to develop logical communication topology 
to express the physical network topology and also failed 
to address the accuracy of passive monitoring in 
generating an accurate logical topology of a network. 
Though passive monitoring aims to monitor network 
traffic without affecting the network latency, our major 
concern is with the accuracy of techniques for generating 
network topology map from passively monitored network 
traffic. In our research we have identified some factors that 
affect the accuracy of logical maps derived from passively 
monitored network traffic in practice and in this paper we 
investigate these factors. 
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III.  NETWORK TOPOLOGY GENERATION 
Network monitoring is an essential and standard tool 
for learning what is happening in a network. The 
technique entails capturing network packet traffic and 
analyzing it. The general principles involved in passive 
topology generation from network traffic monitoring and 
topology generation are discussed in this section with a 
focus on mapping the logical communications topology of 
a network. 
We define a logical network topology as a topology that 
represents the end-to-end communication flow between 
devices on the network.  Though the physical layout of 
the devices on the network is represented by its physical 
topology, the logical topology reveals what 
communication actually occurs in the network. 
Cecil [8] described two types of network topology 
monitoring, which are non-router based techniques. These 
are active network topology monitoring and passive 
network topology monitoring. Active network topology 
monitoring techniques such as ping and traceroute, 
involve probing targeted devices by sending commands 
to obtain traffic information. However, active probing 
requires prior knowledge of the identities and type of 
existing network devices and more importantly, disrupts 
the normal flow of network traffic, which is unacceptable 
in a time-sensitive control system. 
Passive network topology monitoring, unlike active 
monitoring, does not involve injecting or sending any 
commands to probe specific devices. In passive network 
topology monitoring, traffic flowing through an 
observation point is passively captured without 
modifying the traffic that is already in the network.  Also, 
in passive network topology monitoring, the observer 
may be invisible to its neighboring devices, that is, the 
observing device may not generate any messages but 
only observe traffic flowing through it. 
Using passive network topology monitoring, a logical 
network topology can be generated from the captured 
network traffic. In this paper, the generated topology is 
referred to as observed logical network topology. 
However, to verify the accuracy of this observed logical 
network topology, generated from captured network 
traffic via a passive observer, we need to calculate what 
the observer is expected to see under ideal circumstances. 
This derived logical topology is referred to as the expected 
logical topology. Described below are our assumptions 
used for calculating what a passive observer is expected 
to see given a known physical network layout. 
A. Assumptions 
Though our research goal is to generate a logical 
network topology from passively monitored traffic, first 
we need to understand what part of a network‘s logical 
communication topology we would expect to be visible to 
‗observers‘ who capture data traffic at different locations. 
In practice, it is reasonable to assume that messages 
(usually!) follow a shortest path between their source and 
destination (keeping in mind that there may be several 
equally-long shortest paths). In this case, the observable 
logical topology can be considered as a directed graph 
and will include a connection from a source to a 
destination iff all shortest paths between the nodes in the 
digraph include an observer.  
We make some major assumptions. We assume the set 
of nodes is partitioned into two groups, ‗visible‘ and 
‗invisible‘. Visible nodes are those that may be the 
original source or final destination of messages. Visible 
nodes are thus ―noisy‖ and may appear in the observable 
logical topology. In practice, visible nodes are typically 
computing devices or routers, each with a unique address. 
Invisible nodes are those that neither generate new 
messages nor act as the final destination for a message; 
instead they forward messages from one of their 
incoming edges to one or more outgoing edges. These 
intermediate nodes will not appear in the logical topology. 
In practice, invisible nodes are usually simple switching 
devices, needed to move packets through the physical 
network.  
We make a further assumption that we observe the net- 
work for long enough for every possible source-
destination pair of ‗active‘ nodes to communicate via at 
least one message. This assumption maximizes how 
much of the logical graph can be observed.  
Also, we assume a distinguished subset of the nodes 
additionally serve as ‗observers‘ of network traffic. 
Observer nodes record the details of messages passing 
through them and are the way in which we can see 
network activity. Observer nodes may be either visible or 
invisible. In the case of a visible observer, we assume it 
records all messages it generates or receives, as well as 
messages it merely forwards. In practice, a visible 
observer will usually be any device with a mirror port to 
capture data packets sent, received or forwarded, while an 
invisible observer will be an in-line tap which silently 
copies passing data packets, but never generates or 
receives packets of its own. For our purposes the only 
data that needs to be recorded by an observer are the 
―from‖ and ―to‖ fields in the packet headers.  
Finally, we assume that if source and destination 
addresses are observed in a packet, we presume the 
source and destination both exist. In practice, not every 
addressed node is a legitimate node.  
Under these assumptions, in the next section, we 
consider how much of the logical communications 
topology can be gleaned from the messages recorded by 
observers at particular locations in a physical network. 
The answer depends on the way in which active nodes 
generate messages, the routing of messages through the 
network and the location of observer. Before going into 
details of our experimental approach, we need to define 
what an observer is expected to see if passively observing 
traffic in the network.  
B. Observability definition 
We use standard set-theoretic definitions for directed 
graphs and paths through such graphs. Let a directed 
graph or digraph, G = (V, E), be a tuple consisting of a 
set of vertices V and asset of edges E ⊆ V × V. Let an 
edge, (v
1
, v
2
) ∈  E, be an ordered pair denoting a 
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unidirectional link between a source vertex v
1 ∈ V and a 
destination vertex v
2 ∈ V. We can represent the graph as 
an adjacency matrix [13] as shown in equation (1): 
 
            (1) 
 
Let a path, ⟨v
1
, v
2
, . . . v
n
⟩ ∈ Vn, of length n through 
graph G = (V, E) be an ordered set (or ‗sequence‘) of 
vertices v
i 
∈ V such that, for all v
i where1 ≤ i ≤ n, there 
exists an edge (v
i
, v
i+1
) ∈ E in graph G.  
As a special case, let a simple path, ⟨v
1
, v
2
, . . . v
n
⟩, of 
length n through graph G be a path in which there are no 
duplicated vertices in the sequence, i.e., a path such that 
v
i≠vj for all i,j ∈ {1,...,n} where i≠j.  
We assume the existence of standard functions on di- 
graphs for finding paths between vertices and calculating 
the graph‘s transitive closure.  
Given a digraph G = (V, E), a source vertex α ∈ V, 
and a destination vertex ω ∈ V, let the set of all paths 
between these vertices be all paths of the form {α, 
v
2
...vn−1, ω} through graph G, i.e., those paths through G 
such that the first vertex is α and the last vertex is ω. This 
set will be empty if no path from α to ω exists through G. 
We denote the function that returns the set of all paths 
from α to ω through graph G by pt (α, ω, G).  
Given a digraph G = (V, E), a source vertex α ∈ V, 
and a destination vertex ω ∈ V, let the set of all shortest 
paths between these vertices be all paths {α, v
2
...vn−1, ω} 
of length n through graph G such that there does not exist 
a path {α, x
2
...xm−1, ω} of length m through G where m < 
n, i.e., all paths from α to ω for which there is no shorter 
path between these vertices. This set will be empty if no 
path from α to ω exists through G, and it may contain 
multiple values if several shortest paths of the same 
length exist between α and ω. Note that our definition of 
shortest paths is based on the number of hops between the 
source and destination; we assume all edges have equal 
weight. We denote the set of all shortest paths from α to 
ω through graph G by sh (α, ω, G).  
Finally, given a digraph G = (V, E), let its transitive 
closure be a digraph H = (V, F) such that, for all pairs of 
edges (α, ω) ∈ V × V, edge (α, ω) appears in iff there 
exists a path between α and ω through G. We denote the 
transitive closure of graph G by tr (G).  
Definition: Network observability, we assume that 
packets will be sent from their source to their destination 
via the shortest path, so will be seen only by observers on 
that path. However, keeping in mind that there may not 
be a unique shortest path between two nodes, we require 
that there is an observer on every shortest path between 
the source and destination, to ensure that messages routed 
via shortest paths can‘t avoid being seen. We also assume 
that nodes do not send messages to themselves.  
Given a physical topology G, a set O of observer 
vertices and a set I of invisible vertices, we can then 
define the logical topology we would expect to observe. 
Let W = V \ I be the set of all vertices that may appear in 
the logical communications topology. Then the logical 
topology observable in such a network is H = (W, F), 
where F ⊆ W × W, such that for all potential source- 
destination pairs (α, ω) ∈ tr (G), edge (α, ω) appears in F 
iff (i) α≠ω, and (ii) α ∈ W, and (iii) ω ∈ W; and either 
(iv) α ∈ O, or (v) ω ∈ O, or (vi) for all shortest paths P 
∈ sh(α, ω, G) there exists an observer o ∈ O such that o 
∈ P.  
C. Example 
We present a simple example, which illustrates the 
difference between the ―physical network‖ topology and 
the ―expected‖ logical topology observable from captured 
net- work traffic. In Fig. 1 is the physical network 
topology of network, which comprises four devices A, B, 
C and D where C is the observer. 
 
 
Fig.1. Physical Network Topology 
The physical topology in Fig. 1 is modeled and 
translated into an adjacency matrix as shown in Fig. 2 
below. Fig. 3 is the expected logical topology observable 
from the network shown in Fig. 1 according to our 
definition. The difference between the two graphs is that 
in Fig. 3, all nodes were seen but not all connections are 
shown. In Fig. 3, this is no path between B and D because 
there is a shorter path directly from B to D that the 
observer C cannot see.  
 
 
Fig.2. Matrix Representation of Physical Network Communication 
 
Fig.3. Expected Logical Topology as Observed by C
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IV.  THE EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we present our experimental approach, 
which compares the topologies, generated from passively 
monitored traffic with the idealized topologies derived 
from the network model assuming ideal circumstances. 
Fig. 4 is the overview architecture of our approach, which 
consists of three parts. The first part is the box on left 
labeled the ‗expected topology definition‘ where we 
define what an observer is expected to observe under an 
ideal circumstance to produce an expected topology. The 
second part is ‗network traffic mapping‘ which involves 
the observation of a real network by passively monitoring 
the network traffic flowing through the selected observers 
and generating an actual topology. The final process is 
‗topology comparison‘ where we compare the generated 
topologies to check for differences. The entire process 
was automated using a library of Python scripts.  
A. Expected Topology Derivation 
The expected topology is derived from the original 
physical network design. It presents the anticipated 
observable logical communication and is derived based 
on what the observers can see from their location on the 
network given our shortest path assumption. This section 
presents process for deriving the expected topology as 
indicated on the left hand side of our methodology in Fig. 
4. 
Given that the physical network design is known, 
below are the steps to derive the expected topology.  
a) Network modeling from physical network 
Given the physical network‘s design, we represent 
each interface on each physical device as a node and the 
edges between them represent communications links. The 
connectivity between nodes is represented as an 
adjacency matrix using 1 to symbolize nodes 
communicating with each other and 0 to symbolize no 
communication in our representation in Fig. 2. A subset 
of the nodes is then selected as ―observers‖. Similarly 
some nodes are selected as ―in- visible‖, as per the 
assumed physical topology. Observer vertices are those 
network locations at which we assume data traffic is 
being monitored. Typically they denote net- work devices 
such as in-line taps or mirror ports that ‗capture‘ copies 
of passing data traffic for analysis. The location of an 
observer limits what is seen while passively monitoring 
traffic.  
b) Derivation of expected logical topology 
The second procedure is the observability analysis, 
which is required to understand what part of a network‘s 
logical communication topology is visible to ‗observers‘ 
who passively monitor data traffic at different locations. 
We calculate the potential observability based on a 
reachability analysis of the network‘s physical topology 
using the observability definition described in Section 3.2. 
In particular, we analyze what should be seen given the 
assumptions about observer locations, device 
visibility/addressability, and message-routing protocols 
referred to earlier. The steps for calculating the network 
observability to the observers given the physical topology 
are as follows:  
 
 Initialize an empty adjacency matrix  
 Add connections between each observer and all 
other nodes (under our assumption that all nodes 
communicate with one another)  
 For each connection in the physical topology‘s 
transitive closure, add this link to the matrix iff the 
source and destination nodes are different and all 
shortest paths between the source and destination 
contain an observer.  
 Remove all ‗invisible‘ nodes (and their connections) 
from the matrix.  
 
We implemented this calculation as a simple Python 
program and used an off-the-shelf drawing package to 
visualize the resulting graphs.  
B. Network Traffic Mapping 
Mapping a network‘s logical topology gives us 
knowledge of the communication pattern of the network. 
To achieve this, network traffic analysis is required. In 
this section, we present our network traffic mapping 
technique, which is part of our experimental methodology 
as indicated on the right hand side of Fig. 4. Traffic 
mapping involves the extraction of source and destination 
addresses from the captured network packets. The 
mapping process used in this paper to generate a logical 
network topology from passively captured traffic is via 
four processes: identification of observers; network 
capture; data extraction and topology generation. 
 
Expected topology 
definition
Network physical 
topology
Selection of 
observers
Network 
Modelling
Derivation of 
anticipated/expected 
logical topology
Comparison of 
topologies
Generation of actual 
logical topology
Network 
Capture
Data 
Extraction
Network Traffic Mapping 
 
Fig.4. Implementation Architecture of the Experimental Methodology 
i. Identification of observer(s) 
This first step involves identifying the location of a 
non-empty set of devices to serve as observers to 
passively monitor the network traffic flowing. Passive 
monitoring provides detailed topology information about 
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one point on the network that is being monitored. The 
location of an observer limits what is seen while 
passively monitoring traffic. Monitoring a single device 
or point in a network may not be adequate for logical 
topology discovery of the entire network depending on 
how large the network is and its traffic routing. 
Monitoring traffic at various locations on the network and 
adding all the captured traffic into one file for processing 
may be required to obtain substantial information for 
generating a full logical topology. 
ii. Network capture 
This step requires capturing network traffic at the 
selected observer to obtain the packet information needed 
to generate a logical topology of the network. Network 
traffic can be passively monitored using a network tap or 
the use of built-in capabilities on switches such as port 
mirroring [8]. The captured traffic is then converted to a 
csv file and processed off-line.  
iii. Data extraction 
After passively capturing network traffic, the next step 
is the extraction of data. In Fig. 5, we show the data 
extraction process. Contained in every network packet is 
information such as source and destination addresses, 
communication protocol, length of packets, port ID and 
the packet identification number. For our network logical 
topology mapping, the nodes‘ information such as source 
addresses and their corresponding destination addresses 
(IP addresses and MAC addresses) is the only 
information required. The process starts with 
initialization of a list of source-destination address pairs, 
we then check each captured packet to extract the 
addresses and store the information in the list. A logical 
network topology is then generated using the source-
destination pair list.  
iv. Topology generation  
The last step is the generation of the logical topology 
from the list of source-destination pairs into an adjacency 
matrix representation and then generating a visual 
network graph to display the logical topology based on 
what the observers have seen. The generated logical 
topology represents the actual and current state of the 
observed network.  
C. Topology Comparison 
In order to access the accuracy and completeness of the 
generated logical topology from the captured network 
traffic, we then compare the generated topology with the 
expected logical topology derived from the known 
physical topology.  
The comparison entails checking for differences be- 
tween the theoretically derived and actually observed 
logical topologies to identify the differences in the 
topologies and to develop explanations for any deviations 
detected. 
 
 
V.  CASE STUDY 
A SCADA network was developed as shown in Fig. 6 
in a simulated environment. Supervisory Control And  
 
Capture network traffic,
initialise source-destination 
pair list
Is source - 
destination pair 
in list?
Extract source and 
destination IP and MAC 
addresses and 
communication protocol
Topology 
generation
Add to the list
No
Yes
More 
packets to 
process?
Select a 
packet
Yes
 
Fig.5. Network Traffic Mapping Flowchart 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used in 
industrial environments to manage and control critical 
infrastructure such as transport systems, 
telecommunications, power and energy services. A 
SCADA network was used as our case study because of 
the network‘s hierarchical structure, its wide variety of 
components and its well-defined structure with 
predictable traffic behavior, regular network 
communication patterns and limited number of protocols 
[3]. The result of the comparison between the generated 
topologies from the network traffic mapping and the 
anticipated topology generated from the physical 
topology are discussed below. For the purpose of our 
experiment, traffic flowing through two routers and 
SCADA gateway was captured.  
A. Expected Topology Derivation 
In this section, we applied our expected topology 
derivation process to our case study to derive the 
expected logical topology.  
i. Network description 
Fig. 6 shows the SCADA controlled network, which 
includes a Human Machine Interface (HMI), two 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) and a SCADA 
gateway. A SCADA gateway is a device that integrates 
control network components that cannot communicate 
directly with each other while the HMI is a standard 
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application used by a human operator to interact with 
process systems. A PLC is device connected to sensors 
and actuators and converts analogue signals to digital 
data. Our model also contains the corporate network, 
which include two general-purpose processors (PC1, 
PC2). To show how our methodology can discover 
previously unknown devices, we introduce another 
processor PC3, which is assumed to be absent from the 
network‘s original design documentation. Other devices 
on the network include switches SW1, SW2 and SW3, 
and routers R1 to R5. 
 
PLC 1 PLC 2
SW3 SW4
R3 R4
R1 R2
SW1
PC 1
SCADA
Gateway
SW2
HMI
R5PC 2
PC 3
Corporate Network
SCADA Controlled 
Network
 
Fig.6. Experimental Setup 
 
Fig.7. Extracted Data from the Captured Traffic at Router R2 
ii. Assumed communication pattern  
Within the SCADA controlled network as shown in 
Fig. 6, we assume the HMI sends commands to the PLCs 
via the SCADA gateway device. From the corporate 
network, which is a generic IT network, PC1 and PC2 
communicate with the HMI via R5 in the SCADA 
controlled network.  
iii. Derivation of expected logical topology  
To determine what we expect to see when observing 
this network, a network model was developed from the 
existing physical network design as shown in Fig. 6. 
Given the observers as R1, R2 and the SCADA gateway, 
the observability analysis was performed on the modeled 
network. The switches were assumed to be invisible to 
end-devices but forward messages.  
In Fig. 8, 9 and 10 are the expected logical topologies 
based on what the routers R1, R2 and the SCADA 
gateway are expected to see assuming all packets follow 
shortest paths as explained in Section 4. Fig. 11 presents 
a combined graph of what all the observers are expected 
to see. 
 
 
Fig.8. Expected Topology Seen at R1 
 
Fig.9. Expected Topology Seen at R2 
 
Fig.10. Expected Topology Seen at the SCADA Gateway
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Fig.11. Combined Expected Topology for All Observers 
B. Network traffic topology mapping 
To compare this expectation with what these observers 
actually see, the network traffic topology mapping 
described in Section 4.2 was implemented and mapped as 
follows.  
i. Network simulation 
The network in Fig. 6 was developed in a simulated 
environment using GNS3. The network was configured to 
reflect SCADA traffic pattern as described in Section 
5.1.2. R1, R2 and the SCADA gateway were selected as 
passive observers to passively observe traffic flowing 
through the devices. Each active interface on the device 
was monitored and the network traffic flowing through 
the interface was captured.  
ii. Network capture 
After setting up the network as shown in Fig. 6, 
SCADA commands were sent from the HMI to the PLCs, 
which generate traffic. Also from the corporate network 
via PC1, the HMI was accessed to obtain some 
information. Network traffic was monitored and passively 
captured over a period of 180 seconds. The observed 
traffic on each interface of the observed devices was 
stored as a pcap file and processed off-line. Shown in Fig. 
7 is an example of the observed traffic at one of the 
interfaces of router R2.  
iii. Data extraction 
From the stored pcap files, a list of tuples containing 
packet information such as source IP address (src col), 
destination IP address (dst col), source MAC address (src 
MAC col), destination MAC address (dst MAC col) and 
communication protocols (protocol) were extracted from 
each captured packet for the mapping of logical network 
topology of the network. For unique identification of 
network nodes, IP address and MAC address pairs were 
used. Presented in Fig. 7 is an example of the extracted 
data from the captured traffic at observer R2, which 
contains a list of source-destination pairs with their 
corresponding communication protocols.  
iv. Topology generation 
Using the extracted data from the captured traffic at the 
observers R1, R2 and the SCADA gateway, graphs were 
generated. The process includes converting the extracted 
data into adjacency matrix and then used an off-the-shelf 
drawing package to generate the graphs. Fig. 12 and 13 
presents the generated logical topology from the network 
traffic captured at observer R1 (similar to the generated 
topology at the SCADA gateway) while Fig. 13 
represents the logical topology at R2. These graphs are 
explained in our results in Section 6.  
C. Topology comparison 
Given the derived expected topology and the topology 
mapped from actual network traffic, the last procedure of 
our methodology is the comparison of the topologies. We 
found significant difference in the topologies. When 
comparing the expected logical topology against the 
actual topology generated from the captured network 
traffic, the analysis revealed some other factors affecting 
the accuracy of logical topology using passive monitoring. 
Discussed in Section 6 are the identified factors affecting 
the accuracy of passive monitoring in generating an 
accurate logical topology of a network. 
 
 
Fig.12. Observed Topology at R1 
 
Fig.13. Observed Topology at R2 
 
VI.  RESULTS 
The topology comparison revealed some factors 
affecting the accuracy of generating logical topologies 
from passively network captured files. When comparing 
the expected topologies with the actual topologies, our 
analysis showed that the topologies were not aligned, as 
follows.  
a) Undiscovered expected nodes 
In Fig. 12, many nodes were missing when compared 
with the expected Fig. 8. Some nodes may be missing as 
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a result of either the packets taking a longer than 
expected path, thereby avoiding the observer or no traffic 
was observed during the monitoring period. This can be 
caused by:  
 
 Either the network was divided into sub-networks 
and each sub-network was configured not to 
communicate with each other; 
 Or the network device does not talk at all and 
nothing talks to the device, that is, the device is 
inactive. For our case study, the corporate network 
was configured only to talk to the HMI and not any 
devices on the SCADA network. Hence, traffic from 
processors PC1 and PC2 will not be seen by 
observers R1, R2 and the SCADA gateway, thereby 
resulting in some nodes been missed from the 
generated topology from those points. Therefore, to 
be able to generate a complete actual logical 
topology from the passively captured network traffic 
of the network in this case, more points need to be 
observed. 
 
b) Observation of unexpected nodes 
The topology comparative analysis assists in 
identifying unexpected nodes in the network. Fig. 14 is 
the actual logical topology generated from the captured 
traffic showing that there is an unexpected node PC3 on 
the network sending SCADA messages to PLC1 
pretending to be the HMI while in Fig. 8 which is the 
generated expected logical topology, PC3 does not exist 
because it was not part of the assumed physical topology. 
The discovered node was not expected to be on the 
network communicating with PLC1. Such a discovery 
may be indicative that the network has been 
compromised. Any node not identified in the expected 
logical network topology but seen in the observed 
topology from captured network traffic may mean that 
either the physical network topology is out-of-date or the 
discovered node(s) is a malicious intruder.  
c) Broadcast/multicast communication 
In Fig. 12 and 13 are nodes labeled Y and X. These 
anonymous addresses represent the destinations of broad- 
cast messages. Traffic analysis revealed that broad- 
cast/multicast messages were captured with the source 
node having a legitimate address while the destination 
node address was either a broadcast or multicast address. 
For instance, from the captured network traffic in Fig. 8 
at the destination field, one of the packet‘s destinations 
was a Broadcast and analysis revealed that the destination 
node address was a MAC address ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff which is 
a broadcast address. Also in traffic analysis, multicast 
messages were exchanged between R1, R2, R3 and R4 
using IP ad dress 224.0.0.5 as the destination address, 
which we represented as a new node X as shown in Fig. 
12. The communication messages sent in 
broadcast/multicast mode are not addressed to a specific 
node. Some SCADA protocols such as DNP3 and 
GOOSE also use broadcast/multicast to send messages. 
In logical topology mapping, broadcast and multicast 
communication introduces an anonymous node into the 
network thereby affecting the accuracy of the generated 
logical topology.  
d) Disjointed network/connectivity 
According to Fig. 8, all nodes are expected to be 
connected together, but Fig. 13 revealed a disjointed 
network of R1, R2, R3, R4 and X, forming another sub-
network not connected to other parts of the network. This 
behavior further explains the impact of 
broadcast/multicast messages on logical topology 
mapping. Routers R1 to R4 use a default IP address 
224.0.0.5 to send multicast messages to each other to 
populate their forwarding routing tables. The routers only 
forward traffic but do not send messages to end-devices. 
Therefore, routing devices are invisible to end-devices, 
resulting in the observed disjointed communication 
network in this case. In IP networks, the majority of 
communication is of type unicast, that is, a source node 
sending messages to one destination node. In this case, if 
a logical network communication topology was to be 
generated, the topology will show full node connectivity. 
However, with the presence of broadcast and multicast 
communication in a network, the logical network 
topology may show a disjointed network due to the 
introduction of anonymous destination addresses. Though 
additional node(s) are automatically added to the network 
due to broadcast and multicast communication, the 
additional node(s) is not an indication that the network is 
out-of-date but affects the accuracy of the logical 
topology generated from the network using passive 
monitoring.  
 
 
Fig.14. Logical Topology Generated from Network Traffic Analysis 
Observed at the SCADA Gateway 
e) Indirect addressing communication 
In Fig. 14 is the topology generated from the network 
traffic analysis captured at the SCADA gateway. SCADA 
commands were sent from the HMI to PLC 1 and PLC 2 
via the SCADA gateway. Though the commands were 
addressed to the PLCs, the source field of the generated 
network packet used the HMI address as the source node 
and the destination field revealed the SCADA gateway 
address as the destination node. Analysis indicated that 
the commands were further transported to the final 
destinations, which were the PLCs but with the SCADA 
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gateway address as the source address. The SCADA 
gateway checks the payload of the packet datagram for 
the destination address and then directs the messages to 
the appropriate destination. Therefore, the traffic paths 
from the HMI to the PLCs as predicted in the expected 
topology shown in Fig. 10 did not align with the topology 
generated from the network traffic which indicated that 
no traffic was directed to the PLCs by the HMI but traffic 
was directed to the PLCs from the SCADA gateway. 
Indirect addressing communication is commonly found in 
control systems where network packets are sent between 
source and destination node(s) but final destination 
addresses are invisible to the observer(s). The observer 
only sees the intermediary device address as the message 
destination address while the final destination address 
remains invisible to the observer but is stored in the 
payload of the network packets. The invisibility of the 
real destination address to the observer affects what will 
be generated as a logical topology if using passive 
monitoring. 
f) Traffic routing behaviour 
Another factor that can affect the accuracy of passive 
monitoring in generating accurate logical topology that is 
not covered in our experiment is the traffic routing 
behavior. In Fig. 12 and 13, traffic analysis revealed that 
fewer nodes were observed at R2 when compared to R1, 
as expected given that router R1 lies on a shorter path 
than R2 for communication between the top and bottom 
of Fig. 6. The network traffic analysis showed that all 
network packets followed the shortest path to their 
destination from the source. In reality, network packets 
routed are routed via the shortest path from the source to 
the destination but not in all cases. For instance, suppose 
router R1 fails, traffic route will be recalculated, thereby 
forcing all traffic to pass through a longer path.  
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
Up-to-date knowledge of a network‘s topology of a 
network is essential in understanding the current state of 
the network. The standard approach to learning the 
topology of a network is via network traffic analysis. 
Active and passive monitoring are techniques used in 
monitoring network traffic for later analysis. For a critical 
network, active monitoring is not widely deployed 
because of the negative impact it could have on the 
network‘s performance, hence, the use of passive 
monitoring is necessary.  
However, little research has been carried out to 
understand the limitations of passive monitoring in 
generating network‘s topology. The work in this paper 
has shown how to generate the logical communication 
topology from passively captured network traffic, which 
can be used for legacy network mapping on to identifying 
network misconfiguration, or possible intrusions.  
By comparing the derived logical topology we ‗expect 
to see under ideal circumstances with the observed 
logical topology from captured network traffic, we were 
also able to identify practical limitations of network 
mapping from passively captured packets. These include 
the inability to see nodes whose traffic bypassess the 
observer, the inability to determine the destination of 
broadcast messages, and the inability to identify the 
source and destination of messages whose addresses are 
changed in transit.  
In our future work, the selection of the best possible 
place to observe network traffic will be considered. Also, 
the discovery of the physical network topology using 
passive network monitoring will be studied. 
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